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THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA: SHOULD THE STATES
GROW THEIR OWN?
ALEX KREIT'
INTRODUCTION
When thirty federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents armed with M-16s' burst into a medical marijuana hospice in
Santa Cruz, California, on September 5, 2002, arresting the two own-
ers and a wheelchair-bound patient disabled by polio,2 they propelled
an already contentious debate between the federal government andS 3
state leaders to new heights. In response, Santa Cruz officials, who
had "cooperated closely" with the hospice for six years," "issued a pro-
vocative public challenge" to the DEA by organizing an event to dis-
tribute medical marijuana on the steps of City Hall." Mayor Christo-
pher Krohn, who attended the event alongside city council members,
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Gerald F. Uelmen, Pot Got You Confused? You Must Be the DEA, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
25, 2002, at B13.
2 SeeJohn Ritter, Pot Raid Angers State, Patients, USA TODAY, Sept. 17, 2002, at 3A
("[The patient] can't understand ... why [DEA] agents kept ordering her to stand up
after they saw her crutches and leg braces next to the bed. Then when her blood pres-
sure spiked and she felt chest pains, the agents refused to call an ambulance ....").
Medical marijuana advocates have also run into occasional trouble with state of-
ficials. In Colorado, for example, Secretary of State Victoria Buckley refused to count
the votes in a medical marijuana initiative after claiming that initiative sponsors had
not actually obtained the required signatures and that the initiative was improperly put
on the ballot. Peter Blake & Berny Morson, Voters Will Decide on Maijuana: New Secre-
tary of State Says Her Predecessor Undercounted Petitions, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Sept.
22, 1999, at 4A. Less than a year later, Buckley's successor found sixty-six uncounted
petitions in Buckley's office. Id. Buckley had passed away, but her spokesman said he
thought they were there because she had been counting them. Id.
Maria Alicia Gaura, Santa Cruz Officials Fune over Medical Pot Club Bust: DEA Ar-
rests Founders, Confiscates Plants, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6, 2002, at Al.
5 Maria Alicia Gaura & Matthew B. Stannard, Santa Cruz Officials to Defy Feds, Hand
out Medical Pot at City Hall, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 2002, at A23.
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said that "[c]learly, state law and federal law are on a collision course"
and vowed to stand by the hospice until federal law changed.' Vice-
Mayor Emily Reilly went even further, calling it "absolutely loath-
some ... that federal money, energy and staff time would be used to
harass people like this.
7
The outrage spread quickly from Santa Cruz to other parts of Cali-
fornia. Patients organized protests across the state, and "State Attor-
ney General Bill Lockyer protested and demanded a meeting with
[U.S. Attorney General John] Ashcroft."" Just a few weeks after the
Santa Cruz City Hall event, San Jos6 Police Chief William Lansdowne
removed his officers from the DEA's High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area task force in protest.' Officials in other California cities followed
San Jos6's lead and asked their police officers to "stop cooperating
with federal agents."' .. By November 2002, Berkeley, San Francisco,
and Sebastopol had all passed "anti-DEA resolutions.""
Tensions between states and the federal government over medical
marijuana are not limited to California. Since 1996, nine states have
legalized marijuana for medical use, a figure which is likely to in-
crease in the coming years given the overwhelming support for medi-
cal marijuana among voters" and drug policy reform leaders' continu-
ing focus on state ballot initiatives. The systemic problems in
changing drug laws through legislatures, particularly at the federal
6 Christopher Krohn, Why I'm Fighting Federal Drug Laws from City Hall, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2002, at A15.
7 Ritter, supra note 2; cf Gaura, supra note 4 (illustrating the conflict between local
government and the federal government, with one Santa Cruz police officer calling the
DEA agents "a bunch of babies").
Bob Egelko, Medical Pot Rallies Held Across the State, S.F. ClHRON., Sept. 17, 2002, at
A] 6.
1 Mark Simon, San Jose Cops off DEA Squad: Chief Doesn't Want Them Raiding Pot
Clubs, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 10, 2002, at A17.
W Eric Bailey, Pot Raids Spur CalLh to Quit Working with DEA, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2002, at B10.
II ld.
12 In addition to California, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada,
Oregon, and Washington have all enacted medical marijuana laws. Medical Frequently
Asked Questions, Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (Dec. 16, 2002), at
http://www.norml.org/index.cfin?Groupjl D=3387.
1:3 See, e.g.,Joel Stein, The New Politics of Pot, TIME, Nov. 4, 2002, at 57, 57 (reporting
that, according to a Time/CNN poll, eighty percent of adults think medical marijuana
should be legal).
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level,14 make further local and state initiative efforts even more prob-
able.
On the federal side, early efforts to stop medical marijuana by
keeping physicians from recommending the drug ' or obtaining in-
junctions against medical marijuana dispensaries " have given way to
full-blown raids like the one in Santa Cruz. As a candidate, President
George W. Bush said he thought the federal government should re-
spect state decisions on medical marijuana.1 7 However, his drug czar
John Walters, former DEA chief Asa Hutchinson, and current DEA
Administrator John B. Brown III have done just the opposite and in-
tensified federal efforts to suppress marijuana use and fight states that
allow medical marijuana.' Walters views marijuana as a "pernicious"
drug with "destructive effects" and argues that medical marijuana
supporters are involved in a "cynical campaign ... [that] is part of the
drug legalization agenda."''
The federal government has also shown renewed interest in bring-
ing criminal charges against particular medical marijuana growers. In
February 2003, Ed Rosenthal, a long-time drug policy reform activist
who writes for the magazine High Times, was convicted of three federal
14 See, e.g., Aryeh Y. Brown, Comment, Obscured by Smoke: Medicinal Marijuana and
the Need for Representation Reinforcement Review, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 178 (1998)
(arguing that "the legislative inability to deal with this issue" is so monumental that
"people with a medical need for marijuana.., represent a suspect class-a class of
people for whom the legislative system can offer no recourse").
SeeAdministration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposi-
tion 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) (relying on protecting the "public
interest" to justify administrative action revoking any practitioner's registration if she
prescribes or recommends marijuana to a patient).
16 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse,Justices Set Back Use of Marijuana to Treat Sickness, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 2001, at Al (reporting that the Justice Department sought an injunc-
tion rather than a criminal prosecution in a medical marijuana case, thereby avoiding
ajury trial in ajurisdiction in which nearly three-quarters of the voters supported Cali-
fornia's Proposition 215, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2003)).
In a civil case, the government can attempt to bypass a jury entirely by moving for
summary judgment.
17 See Spencer S. Hsu, Bush: Marijuana Laws up to States; But GOP Candidate Says
Congress Can Block D.C. Measure, WASH. POsT, Oct. 22, 1999, at B7 ("Bush answered
questions about medical marijuana laws by saying, 'I believe each state can choose that
decision as they so choose."').
18 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 13, at 57-61 (discussing Walters's efforts to campaign
against passage of additional state drug reform measures).
19 John P. Walters, The Myth of "Harmless" Marijuatna, WASH. POST, May 1, 2002, at
20031 1789
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counts of marijuana cultivation and conspiracy.2" Rosenthal was grow-
ing medical marijuana as a designated agent of the city of Oakland.
However, district court Judge Charles R. Breyer-who also heard the
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative case 2'-barred all evidence re-
lating to Proposition 21522 and Rosenthal's purpose in growing mari-
juana. Upon learning of the excluded evidence after the trial, five ju-
rors issued a public apology to Rosenthal and called for the conviction
to be overturned . Juror Marney Craig said that convicting Rosenthal
was "the most horrible mistake I've ever made in my entire life. And I
don't think that I personally will ever recover from this.
2 4
In the face of continuing federal opposition after a loss in the Su-
preme Court on the issue of medical necessity,5 medical marijuana
advocates have turned toward arguments concerning limits on federal
power and placed the issue at the center of two recent California law-
suits. In one, Santa Cruz hospice founders Valerie and Michael Corral
are demanding that the federal government return all items seized
during the September 5 raid-including the marijuana-arguing that
their activity was purely intrastate and thus beyond federal authority.'
In the other case, two patients and two care givers are seeking an in-
junction to prevent the federal government from arresting or prose-
20 Dean E. Murphy, jurors Who Convicted Marijuana Grower Seek New Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A14. It is interesting to note that criminal charges were
brought against Rosenthal but have not been lodged in other medical marijuana inves-
tigations, such as that of the Santa Cruz hospice. Singling out for prosecution a high-
profile defendant who has committed a common offense indicates there may be politi-
cal motivations behind the choice. See Orro KIRCHIIIEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE
USE OF LEGAL IROCEDURE FOR POLIIIC AL ENDS 46 (1961) (recognizing as a type of po-
litical trial "[t]he trial involving a common crime committed for political purposes and
conducted with a view to the political benefits which might ultimately accrue from suc-
cessful prosecution").
21 United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1998),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109 (9th
Cir. 1999) (per curian), rev'd, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). For a discussion of this case and its
history on appeal, see infa text accompanying notes 72-76, 187-93.
22 Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEIALTH & SAFElIY CODE § 11362.5 (West
Supp. 2003).
Murphy, supnra note 20.
24 Id.
25 See Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coolp., 532 U.S. at 491 (rejecting the medical neces-
sity defense on the basis that such an exception would conflict with the Controlled
Substances Act, Pub. IL. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242-84 (1970) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000))).
26 Maria Alicia Gau,'a, Pot Co-op Sues After Con fiscation: Santa Cruz Croup Pushes for
Medical Use, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2002, at A18.
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cuting them for their medical-marijuana-related activity. The plain-
tiffs contend that they "exclusively [use] growing equipment, supplies
and materials manufactured within the borders of the State of Cali-
fornia.,2 The issues in these cases may pose challenging Commerce
Clause questions, but a variety of factors indicate it is unlikely they, or
any other effort to limit federal power in the case of private medical
marijuana distribution, will ultimately succeed.'
Medical marijuana proponents who think "the federal govern-
ment should stay out of the way"2 0 should look to state and local dis-
tribution schemes as their best opportunity to place their conduct
outside federal reach. There are already indications that movement
leaders and frustrated local officials view this as the emerging ap-
proach. In the 2002 elections, San Franciscans approved a measure
directing the city to "study growing and dispensing marijuana for
medical purposes in response to federal crackdowns.' ', Two years ear-
lier, the Maine state legislature considered implementing a program
that would have distributed marijuana confiscated by the State during
regular drug arrests to patients. One of the principle supporters of
the idea, Cumberland County Sheriff Mark N. Dion, asked, "Shall we
as a sovereign state be held hostage by the federal government simply
because we intend to treat our sick and afflicted?-2 A similar proposal
was included in a defeated 2002 Arizona ballot initiative that featured
a number of other drug policy reforms, such as decriminalization of
marijuana for recreational use:2
27 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 2, Raich v. Ashcroft, No. 02-4872 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 29, 2002) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Memorandum], available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/drugs/
raichashcrft102902mem.pdf.
28 Id. at 6.
21) See infra Part III (discussing the problems private medical marijuana growers
and users face in Commerce Clause arguments).
3 Where Does Your Pot Grow?, S.F. CHRON.,July 26, 2002, at A24.
31 Patrick Hoge, Voters Back City Pot Distribution: Measure Would Have S.E Study
Growing, Dispensing Marijuana, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 2002, at A26; see also Rachel
Gordon, Initiative Asks City to Roll Its Own: Proposal S Could Put S.E in the Marijuana
Business, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 2002, at Al3 ("'If the federal government continues to
assault, intimidate and close our community-based cannabis clubs, leaving many thou-
sands of our citizens unable to access medicine, . . . we must have an alternative distri-
bution network prepared to serve their needs,' said San Francisco Supervisor Mark
Leno, the measure's chief sponsor.").
Carey Goldberg, Maine Sees Medical Use for Its Seized Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 2000, at Al 6.
33 Elvia Diaz & Christina Leonard, Day After Election, Winners and Losers Alike Make
Plans, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 2002, at 21A.
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The response to federal medical marijuana policy, both from pri-
vate individuals operating legally under state law and those who argue
for state-run distribution schemes, poses a distinct set of problems un-
der the new Commerce Clause doctrine. In the two most famous
Commerce Clause cases of the last ten years, United States v. Lopez"4 and
United States v. Morison, " the Supreme Court overturned federal stat-
utes that were by and large supported by the states in which they op-
erated.M In each case, the challenges were brought by private indi-
viduals, not the states themselves. One commentator has referred to
the statutes overturned in those cases as "duplicative federal legisla-
tion" and has argued that "[t] he Court accomplishes little when it in-
tervenes to protect the states" in such 'situations.17 By contrast, the
fight over medical marijuana involves conduct that is prohibited by
the federal government but affirmatively allowed under state law. Un-
der state or local distribution regimes, government officials them-
selves would participate in activity that is criminal'under federal law.
This Comment looks at the future of the medical marijuana de-
bate by considering federal power under the Commerce Clause to
reach state-run medical marijuana distribution under a hypothetical
program similar to those proposed in Maine, Arizona, and San Fran-
cisco. Part I discusses the history and present state of the modern
medical marijuana movement. Part II provides a summary and discus-
sion of federalism principles, in particular the Commerce Clause doc-
trine. Part III examines the Controlled Substances Act, the federal
law which regulates marijuana, as well as the difficulties that face
Commerce Clause challenges under existing state medical marijuana
laws. Part IV proposes a hypothetical state-run medical marijuana
regulatory program and analyzes whether the federal government
could constitutionally outlaw such a program. The Comment con-
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
35 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
56 See infra Part II.C (discussing the federal statutes disputed in Lopez and Morri-
son) .
37 Susan R. Klein, A Colloquium on Community Policing: Independent-Norm Federalism
in Cfiminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1541, 1550 (2002). In this insightful piece, Klein
notes with respect to Lopez that "a failure at the state level to separately criminalize gun
possessions near schools cannot rationally be equated with approval of such conduct"
and argues that the problem would have been entirely different "[h]ad a state enacted
a provision affirmatively exempting such gun possession from criminal proscription or
other sanctions (or been willing to state for the Court on the record that it desired that
students bring guns to class)." Id. at 1549-50. Indeed, Lopez was originally charged
with violating a Texas law forbidding firearm possession on school premises. Lopez,
514 U.S. at 551.
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cludes that medical marijuana advocates should focus on enacting re-
gimes run by state or local governments in the future as providing the
strongest potential for protection against federal intervention.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSES
TO MEDICAL MARIJUANA
The debate in the United States over the medicinal value of mari-
juana dates back to the middle of the 1800s. " Although there was
never a consensus on the extent of its efficacy, marijuana was gener-
ally thought to have some therapeutic value and was included in the
United States Pharmacopeia until 1941. Marijuana use and distribution,
medical or otherwise, was not significantly regulated by the federal
government until the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.4" The tax essen-
tially amounted to a prohibition for recreational users who had to pay
a fee of $100 an ounce,"' which was significantly more than the cost of
the marijuana itself. On its face, the Act was much more accepting of
medical use of marijuana and taxed registered medical marijuana
transactions at only one dollar an ounce . Nevertheless, "the law
made medical use of cannabis difficult because of the extensive pa-
perwork required of doctors who wanted to use it., 43 When Congress
was considering the Act, the American Medical Association represen-
tative objected to it "because he believed that its ultimate effect would
be to strangle any medical use of marihuana, ' ', 4 and indeed shortly af-
ter its enactment, "medical distribution of the drug had all but disap-
peared.
4
5
While effectively eliminated, medical marijuana use and distribu-
tion was still technically allowed under the Marihuana Tax Act until
38 See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN
MEDICINE 4-7 (rev. & expanded ed. 1997) (providing a historical overview of early stud-
ies of marijuana's value as a medicine).
39 Id. at 8.
40 Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551, repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101, 84 Stat. 1236, 1292; see
RICHARDJ. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD 1I, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION: A
HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 154-74 (1974) (discussing
the effort to pass the Marihuana Tax Act).
41 § 7(a) (2), 50 Stat. at 554.
42 § 7(a) (1), 50 Stat. at 554.
43 GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 38, at 8.
44 BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 40, at 164.
45 Id. at 175.
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the passage of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in 1970.' The
CSA was passed in large part because President Nixon saw regulation
of the drug trade as an opportunity for the federal government to sat-
isfy public demand to get tough on crime.4 7 "[H]aving won the elec-
tion on a law-and-order promise, Nixon had to create a federal role in
policing street crime. His aides settled on policing drug use not
only because it could be tied to the common problem of street crime,
but also because, unlike other local crimes, it involved interstate
commerce.9 It was in this context that marijuana was placed in
Schedule 1,5") the CSA category of drugs with a high potential for abuse
and no currently accepted medical use.
5 '
In the aftermath of the CSA, drug policy reformers began promot-
ing medical marijuana legalization. The idea had already gained re-
newed interest in the late 1960s, as dramatic increases in recreational
use led many to accidentally stumble upon marijuana's medical util-
ity." In the late 197 0s and early 1980s, thirty-three states passed medi-
cal marijuana laws;5': however, they were very different than the state
legislation disputed today. Instead of allowing large scale use or dis-
tribution programs in violation of the CSA, the majority of these state
laws established therapeutic research programs that were officially ap-
proved by the federal government under the FDA's Investigational
54New Drug (IND) program . These state programs were disbanded in
46 Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. I1, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242-84 (1970) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2000)).
47 See DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF
FAILURE 13-21 (1997) (discussing the political motivations behind Nixon's efforts to
launch a "war on drugs").
48 id. at 13.
4,. Id. at 15.
50 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. 1 (2000).
51 § 812(b)(1)(A)-(B). The tension between the Schedule I classification of mari-
juana as having no medical value and the Federal Investigational New Drug programs
that allowed very limited medical marijuana use was never explained by the federal
government.
52 See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 38, at 13 ("In the 1960s, as large numbers
of people began to use marihuana recreationally, anecdotes about its medical utility
began to appear, generally not in the medical literature but in the form of letters to
popular magazines like Playboy."). Prior to the 1960s, very few people, aside from those
who had studied marijuana, knew of its potential as a medicine. Id.
53 /d. at 17.
54 See Nicole Dogwill, Comment, The Burning Question: How Will the United States
Deal with the Medical-Marijuana Debate?, 1998 DETROIT C. L. REV. 247, 256-67 (providing
a detailed overview of these state programs and their legal relationships to federal law).
Other state laws allowed individual physicians to prescribe medical marijuana to pa-
tients. /d. at 267-69. These statutes had even less of an impact because they generally
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1986 when the FDA approved the drug Marinol, a synthetic version of
one of marijuana's main chemicals, tetrahydrocannabinol, commonly
known as THC .
Because of the difficulty states faced in implementing IND pro-
grams, a simultaneous effort emerged to allow individual patients ac-
cess to marijuana. Glaucoma patient Bob Randall was the first to ob-
tain such individualized permission when, entirely as a result of
Randall's struggle, the federal government created the "Compassion-
ate IND" program."6 The program theoretically made it possible for
patients to access medical marijuana through their doctors, though
the application process was not easy. INDs were never intended to fa-
cilitate medical care for individual patients, but rather were designed
as a mechanism for pharmaceutical companies to "assure the safety of
new drugs. ' Because the Compassionate IND program operated un-
der this same structure, it required a level of paperwork and proce-
dural know-how that made it nearly impossible for the average patient
or doctor to gain access. By the time the Compassionate IND pro-
gram was discontinued in March of 1992, there were only thirteen
qualified patients. Today, the remaining seven patients continue to
receive a regular supply of medical marijuana directly from the fed-
eral government.
While the IND programs offered assistance to a limited number of
patients, medical marijuana advocates did not see the programs as
long-term solutions. Instead, most medical marijuana advocates of the
1970s argued outright to decriminalize marijuana, which, of course,
would have made laws specifically covering medicinal use unneces-
contained requirements that were impossible to meet. For example, Louisiana re-
quired that the prescribing physician obtain DEA approval in order to dispense mari-
juana legally under state law. Id. at 269.
55 [d. at 255. Although Marinol is currently available, most patients and medical
marijuana advocates claim it is not an acceptable substitute for marijuana because it is
not nearly as effective in treating most ailments. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note
38, at 38-39 (arguing that marijuana may be preferable to Marinol because THC is only
one of many chemicals contained in marijuana and because marijuana is more
reliably and quickly absorbed into the bloodstream than Marinol).
56 See ROBERT C. RANDALL & ALICE M. O'LEARY, MARIJUANA RX: THE PATIENTS'
FIGHT FOR MEDICINAL POT 104-12 (1998) (discussing the Compassionate IND pro-
gram's origin as a government response to Randall's activist work).
57 GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 38, at 20.
Id. at 22.
59 Should Smoked Marijuana Be a Medical Option Now?, A-Mark Found., at http://
www.marijuanainfo.org/faqs-list2.php?tthis-cat=119 (last visited May 8, 2003). The
other six patients have since died. Id.
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sary. ° In addition to political lobbying efforts, the National Organiza-
tion for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) filed an administra-
tive action in 1972 to move marijuana to a more lenient classification
under the CSA." ' Initially, the petition sought to remove marijuana
from the CSA entirely or, alternatively, to transfer it from Schedule I
to Schedule V,62 the least restrictive schedule, which covers drugs that
have a low potential for abuse and are currently accepted for medical
use. The government refused to hold a hearing on the subject, and
NORML sued to force a rulemaking proceeding. After a complex
and lengthy legal battle, hearings were held in 1986 before Adminis-
trative Law Judge Francis Young, who concluded that marijuana is
"one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to man" and
recommended it be placed in Schedule 11. "' Administrator John C.
Lawn denied the recommendation one year later,"'; resulting in fur-
ther litigation until the matter was finally resolved in favor of the DEA
in 1994 .
After the resolution of NORML's rescheduling petition, the possi-
bility of a medical marijuana system at the federal level was not prom-
ising. Advocates adopted a new strategy and, in 1996, placed initia-
tives on the ballot in California and Arizona to decriminalize medical
marijuana Under state law, without regard to federal policy. Both ini-
tiatives passed, but the Arizona legislature effectively nullified the re-
stilt in its state by putting prescribing doctors at risk of losing their li-
CA In the 1970s, marijuana decriminalization was significantly more politically vi-
able than it is today. A 1972 bipartisan presidential commission, formed under the
CSA to study marijuana, recommended its decriminalization. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD,
sapm note 40, at 270. Although President Nixon rejected the idea, it was embraced by
a number of liberal leaders and, ultimately, by President Carter, who backed eliminat-
ing federal penalties for possession of tIp to one ounce of marijuana. Edward Walsh,
Carter Lndorses Decrtminalization of Marijuana, WASHi. PosT, Aug. 3, 1977, at Al.
0 See Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. DEA, 559 F.2d 735, 741-45
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing the history of the administrative action and the initial re-
suiting litigation).
6 1d. at 741.
63 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(5) (A)-(B) (2000).
64 Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654, 654
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
65 Michael Isikoff, Administrative Law Judge Urges Medicinal Use of Marijuana, WASH.
POST, Sept. 7, 1988, at A2 (quotingJudge Young).
6 Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,767 (Dec. 29, 1989).
i7 See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1137 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (denying a petition for review of the Administrator's final order declining to
move marijuana to Schedule II of the CSA).
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censes.' In California, however, in addition to allowing for medicinal
use, the law permitted designated caregivers to grow marijuana for pa-
tients.'il Although California state courts have held that the provision
does not shield marijuana dispensaries,7 ' custom and support from lo-
cal officials have practically legalized the activity for purposes of state
law enforcement." The developing state system has thereby effectively
ceded enforcement of all medical-marijuana-related activity, including
distribution and growth, to the federal government.
The federal response to California's initiative included strategies
aimed at both marijuana dispensaries and physicians. Just over a year
after the passage of California's medical marijuana law, the federal
government sought to enjoin the cultivation and distribution of mari-
juana by six different medical marijuana dispensaries.7 ' The Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's order upholding the injunction,
finding that the medical necessity defense would likely apply to Oak-
land Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative's (OCBC) actions.7 ' The Supreme
Court reversed, finding that medical necessity was not a valid defense
for the manufacture and distribution of marijuana because the legisla-
ture itself had "le[ft] no doubt that the defense [was] unavailable." 7
The Court did not consider "whether the Controlled Substances Act
68 Elvia Diaz, Medical Marijuana Debate Flares, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 2002, at 7B.
69 Compassionate Use Act of 1996 § 1, CAL. HALTII & SAFEIYCODE § 11362.5(d)
(West Supp. 2003).
70 People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 31 (Ct. App. 1997).
71 Local officials in many of California's largest cities and the State Attorney Gen-
eral have shown approval for medical marijuana dispensaries. The City of Oakland
declared a city-wide health emergency when the federal government sought to close
down the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative. United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev'd, 532 U.S. 483
(2001).
72 United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal.
1998), rewd sub noan. Oakland Canasbis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d at 1115, rev'd, 532 U.S. at
499. By the time the case reached the Ninth Circuit, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooerative was the only dispensary remaining in the case. 190 F.3d at 1111.
190 F.3d at 1114-15.
74 532 U.S. at 491. Though the opinion was technically limited to manufacture
and distribution, some dicta suggests that it may also cover use. See, e.g., id. at 493 (re-
jecting OCBC's argument that the "use of schedule I drugs ... can be medically neces-
sary"). This led Justice Stevens to file a concurring opinion in which he criticized the
majority for "suggesting that the defense of necessity is unavailable for anyone under
the Controlled Substances Act." Id. at 500-01 (Stevens, J., concurring). "[W]hether
the defense might be available to a seriously ill patient for whom there is no alternative
means of avoiding starvation or extraordinary suffering is a difficult issue that is not
presented here." Id. at 501 (StevensJ., concurring).
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exceeds Congress' power under the Commerce Clause., 75  On re-
mand, the district court issued a permanent injunction against
OCBC.
76
In addition to taking action against individual dispensaries, the
federal government attempted to effectively block the state law en-
tirely by punishing doctors who recommended marijuana.77 Without a
doctor's recommendation, it would be impossible for anyone to qual-
ify as a medical user and receive protection under state law.7 s Shortly
after federal officials announced the plan, a group of California doc-
tors and patients filed suit to enjoin its implementation. Unani-
mously upholding a district court ruling, the Ninth Circuit perma-
nently enjoined the federal government "from either revoking a
physician's license to prescribe controlled substances or conducting
an investigation of a physician that might lead to such revocation,
where the basis for the government's action is solely the physician's
professional 'recommendation' of the use of medical marijuana. ' '
The court ruled that the proposed investigations into physician rec-
ommendations would threaten expression protected by the First
Amendment."' With physicians free to recommend marijuana, shield-
75 Id. at 495 n.7.
76 United States v. Cannabis Cultivator's Club, Nos. C 98-00085 CRB to -00088
CRB, -00245 CRB, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10660, at *9 (N.D. Cal.June 10, 2002).
77 See Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California Proposi-
tion 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164, 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) ("DEA will seek to revoke the DEA
registrations of physicians who recommend or prescribe Schedule I controlled sub-
stances.").
78 See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concur-
ring) ("The federal government's attempt to target doctors-eliminating the only vi-
able mechanism for distinguishing between legal and illegal drug use-is a back-door
attempt to 'control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties."'
(quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000))).
79 Id. at 633.
SO Id. at 632. Judge Kozinski noted this was a "highly unusual exercise of discre-
tion in enjoining the federal defendants from even investigating possible violations of
the federal criminal laws." d. at 640 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 637; see id. ("Moreover, the policy does not merely prohibit the discussion
of marijuana; it condemns expression of a particular viewpoint, i.e., that medical mari-
juana would likely help a specific patient."). In his concurrenceJudge Kozinski noted
that in addition to the First Amendment rights of patients, federalism concerns were
central to his opinion of the case.
I believe the federal government's policy runs afoul of the "commandeering"
doctrine announced by the Supreme Court .... Applied to our situation, this
means that, much as the Federal government may prefer that California keep
medical marijuana illegal, it cannot force the state to do so. Yet, the effect of
the federal government's policy is precisely that ....
Id. at 645-46 (KozinskiJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
SHOULD THE ST"A TFS GROW THIIR OWN?
ing those who receive recommendations from prosecution under state
law, the DEA has been left with the daunting task of attacking the
California medical marijuana system on a case-by-case basis.
Medical marijuana advocates have enjoyed tremendous success at
the state level since 1996,2 but they continue to have difficulty chang-
ing or finding ways to exempt their activity from federal law. Shortly
after the passage of Proposition 215, Congress passed a "sense of the
Congress" resolution in opposition to medical marijuana;1 and, given
the Bush administration's hostility toward medical marijuana,' federal
efforts to circumvent state medical marijuana laws will likely continue.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Conant v. Walters severely
limits the ease with which the federal government can achieve these
goals. Because the DEA is unlikely to target medical marijuana users
themselves, ' state medical-marijuana-decriminalization measures can
prove useful to some patients despite federal limitations on distribu-
tion and manufacture. At the same time, however, these state laws of-
fer little help to patients who cannot obtain marijuana from the black
market or cultivate their own. Often, procuring marijuana through
such means is difficult due to the severity of the illness.8 ' Without reli-
82 Prior to the 2002 election, "[m]edical marijuana initiatives had won in all eight
states where they had been on the ballot." Ethan Nadelman, The Hospice Raid and the
War on Dr v, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 19, 2002, at B13. In the 2002 election, an
Arizona ballot measure to establish distribution of state-seized marijuana for medical
purposes was rejected. Diaz & Leonard, supra note 33. This has been the only state
medical marijuana initiative to fail; however, Arizona voters have already approved a
medical marijuana initiative permitting individual use, although state lawmakers "ef-
fectively nixed its use by putting doctors at risk of losing their licenses for prescribing
it." id.
8 Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. F, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-760.
84 For recent examples of the federal government's attempts at combating medical
marITIlana, see supra Introduction.
The DEA's limited resources make it practically impossible for its officers to en-
force minor possession laws without extensive cooperation friom state police. Addi-
tionally, the potential for public backlash militates against plans to go after medical
marijuana users. See, e.g., William Claiborne & Roberto Suro, Medicinal Marijuana
Brings Legal Headache, WASH. Posr, Dec. 5, 1996, at Al ("Federal agencies have the law
behind them but ... with limited resources, their focus would remain on major trat-
tickers." (citing statements made by Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Administrator from
March 1994 toJuly 1999)). But cf Marijuana Grower Sentenced to 27 Months, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1999, at A21 (telling the story of B.E. Smith, an outspoken proponent of
Proposition 215 who was convicted of felony mariiuana possession and cultivation after
being accused of growing marijuana on federal land).
See Declaration of Martin Martinez at 3, United States v. Cannabis Cultivator's
Club, No. 98-00088, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10660 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2002) ("It is not
practical for a severely disabled person to run around the streets looking for a safe and
reliable source of illegal cannabis.").
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able methods of distributing medical marijuana, state medical mari-
juana laws are often least effective for the primary population they are
designed to help.
For these reasons, efforts to avoid federal regulation and to estab-
lish reliable distribution programs continue even in areas where state
and local law affords private marijuana distributors significant protec-
• 7
tion. Short of changing federal law, recent Commerce Clause cases
provide the best opportunity for the establishment of a completely le-
gal medical marijuana distribution system. If successful, a Commerce
Clause challenge might allow state-approved distribution systems to
operate free of federal interference. The following Part reviews the
current state of Commerce Clause doctrine to provide a context in
which the potential for such a challenge can be analyzed.
II. FEDERAL POWETR AND STATES' RIGHTS
A. Commerce Clause
In 1937, the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations
Act as a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power
to regulate interstate commerce.8 8 The decision marked a dramatic
shift away from the previous "direct-indirect" Commerce Clause stan-
dard, W' under which key pieces of President Roosevelt's New Deal were
struck down, '° and toward a more "practical conception of the com-
merce power. ''!) This practical conception focuses on whether there is
87 San Francisco, for example, has given incredible support to private dispensaries
that operate within the city. The San Francisco District Attorney was given an award
for his "courage and leadership" on the medical marijuana issue. Jonathan Curiel, Pro-
Marijuana Group Honoring S.F. 's Hallinan: Award Will Be Named.for D.A., S.F. CHRON.,
June 9, 2000, at A2 1. However, the relative ease with which patients can currently ob-
tain marijuana in San Francisco did not stop voters from passing a 2002 proposition in
favor of a city-run program better positioned to avoid federal regulation. See generally
Hoge, supra note 31 (reporting the passage of the 2002 measure and its details).
. NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937).
9 Cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548-49 (1935)
(characterizing the "direct-indirect" standard as "a fundamental one, essential to the
maintenance of our constitutional system," and holding that Congress could not con-
stitttionally set minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws because they were only indi-
rectly related to cost and prices).
• The Court had so frustrated President Roosevelt that he proposed adding new
,Justices in what was popularly called his court-packing plan. See generally Alpheus
Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Slone and FlD's Cour Plan, 61 YAI.E L.J. 791 (1952) (exam-
ining Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
9 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573 (1995) (Kennedy, ., concurring).
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a rational basis for finding that the regulated activity, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.92
The implications of the Court's new standard became clear in
Wickard v. Filburn, decided in 1942. ' Filburn, a wheat farmer, sought
to enjoin the government from enforcing against him the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, ' which aimed to stabilize the price of wheat
by regulating its intrastate production' Filburn exceeded his acreage
allotment, using the additional wheat to feed his livestock and to pro-
duce home-consumed flour. The Court held that applying the Act to
Filburn was a lawful exercise of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause, even though it covered "production not intended in
any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm" and
the "[p]enalties d[id] not depend upon whether any part of the
wheat, either within or without the quota, [was] sold or intended to
be sold."" The Court argued that regulating intrastate activity like
Filburn's was vital to the proper functioning of Congress's regulation
of national wheat prices and that such activity, in the aggregate, had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. If every farmer were al-
lowed to produce unlimited supplies of wheat for personal consump-
tion, the government would not have been able to raise the price of
wheat in the national market."
Even after Wickard, the Court occasionally relied on other theories
in Commerce Clause cases, such as whether an item had moved in in-
terstate commerce. In United States v. Sullivan, the Court upheld the
conviction of a pharmacist for selling a total of twenty-four pills on two
separate occasions without statutorily required directions for use or
warnings of danger.""' The Court found it was within the Commerce
Clause power "to regulate the branding of articles that have com-
pleted an interstate shipment and are being held for future sales in
purely local or intrastate commerce" because the articles had moved
92 Id. at 600 (Thomas,J., concurring).
9.1' 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
94 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (2000).
91" 317 U.S. at 113.
96 d. at 114.
97 Id. at 118-19.
98 See id. at 127-28 ("That [Filburn's] own contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him fron the scope of federal regula-
tion where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial.").
99 Id. at 128-29.
100 332 U.S. 689, 691-92 (1948).
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in interstate commerce."" Wickards aggregation principle, in combi-
nation with the substantial effects doctrine, seemed to give Congress
almost limitless power under the Commerce Clause, and for over fifty
years every statute faced with a Commerce Clause challenge was up-
held."
12
1. Lopez: Defining Limits to the Commerce Power
The Supreme Court abandoned its liberal approach to federal
power under the Commerce Clause in 1995 with its five-to-four deci-
sion in United States v. Lopez, in which it held part of the Federal Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA) unconstitutional.' ° The
GFSZA made gun possession in a school zone, defined as within one
thousand feet of a school, a federal criminal offense. ") Lopez, a
twelfth-grade student, brought a .38-caliber gun to school, which was
found by school officials acting on an anonymous tip." He was ar-
rested by the police and charged originally under state law.'" The
next day, state charges were dismissed and Lopez was charged, and ul-
timately convicted, under section 922(q) of the GFSZA. "' Lopez ap-
pealed on the grounds that section 922(q) was beyond the limits of
Congress's Commerce Clause power.109
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began his analy-
sis by giving a historical overview of important Commerce Clause deci-
sions. He concluded that the cases revealed "three broad categories
of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power."""
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activi-
ties. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regu-
I01 (1. at 698.
102 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 2000) ("From 1937
to 1995, the Supreme Court consistently upheld federal legislation against claims that
Congress had overstepped its authority under the Commerce Clause.").
514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (25) (2000).
§ 922(q) (2) (A).
I06 514 U.S. at 551.
1(07 Id.
I8 ld.
I09 /d.at 552.
10 i. at 558.
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late those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.111
Rehnquist emphasized that the proper standard for the final category
was not merely whether an activity affects interstate commerce, but
whether it substantially affects interstate commerce."'
The Court quickly concluded that section 922(q) could not be de-
fended under either of the first two categories and turned its analysis
to the third."' Rehnquist then further divided the third category into
two subcategories-economic activity and noneconomic activity' -
indicating that, while legislation regulating economic activity would al-
ways be sustained as a valid exercise of commerce power," non-
economic activity would be subject to a more stringent review.'
Rehnquist concluded that possession of a gun in a school zone was a
criminal act that "by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms.""7 The Court did not detail what level of effect would be
needed to meet the "substantial effects" test for noneconomic activity
but criticized the statute for its lack of congressional findings, which
"would [have] enable[d] [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judg-
ment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate,,I IS
commerce. The Court then discussed the government's arguments
concerning the ways in which gun possession in a school zone affects
MId. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
112 See id. at 559 (concluding that, while the "case law has not been clear whether
an activity must 'affect' or 'substantially affect' interstate commerce," the "proper test
requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate
commerce").
113 Id.
114 Id. at 559-61.
115 See id. at 560 ("[T]he pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.").
116 See . at 561 (arguing that previous Commerce Clause cases involved economic
activity and therefore more likely involved valid exercise of congressional power). The
Court seemed to imply that, unlike noneconomic activity, economic activity would al-
ways have a substantial effect on interstate commerce when aggregated:
Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic ac-
tivity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a
commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce.
Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 563.
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interstate commerce and concluded that the link was too attenu-
ated. "' In addition to these criticisms, the Court faulted section
922(q) for lacking ajurisdictional element, such as a requirement that
the gun have moved in interstate commerce, "which might limit its
reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." 120
The Court also argued that upholding the statute would allow
Congress to regulate areas traditionally left to the states. "Under the
theories that the Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is dif-
ficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such
as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically
have been sovereign."' Rehnquist argued that accepting the federal
government's arguments would also allow Congress to regulate the
curriculum of local schools122 and said that the Commerce Clause
power "does not include the authority to regulate each and every as-
pect of local schools."' 2' In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy relied
heavily on the notion that education was a traditional area of state
concern. He believed that, because the proximity to schools, "includ-
ing of course schools owned and operated by the States. . . , is the
very premise for making the conduct criminal," the Court has "a par-
ticular duty to ensure that the federal-state balance is not de-
stroyed.'
2 4
2. Morrison: NotJust a Misstep
Whether Lopez represented a true change in the Court's view of
Commerce Clause doctrine was not immediately apparent. In his dis-
sent in Lopez, Justice Souter wondered whether the decision was "an
epochal case" or "only a misstep.'02 5 The Court's decision in United
States v. Morrison"' showed that, at the very least, Lopez was not an
anomaly.
119 Id. at 563-64; see also id. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here,
we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States.").
120l Id. at 562.
121 Id. at 564.
122 Id. at 565.
123 Id. at 566.
12,t Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125 /d. at 614-15 (SouterJ., dissenting).
12G 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Vir-
ginia Tech), claimed that another student, Antonio Morrison, raped
her and made statements that demonstrated a gender motivation for
the attack.'2 7 Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison under Vir-
ginia Tech's disciplinary policy, at which time Morrison admitted to
/ 28
raping her. The school punished him with a two-semester suspen-
sion, but after an appeal, another conviction, and another appeal,
Virginia Tech set aside the punishment.'2  Brzonkala then filed a fed-
eral civil suit under section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 (VAWA), which provided a private cause of action for victims
of gender-motivated violent acts."1'0 Morrison challenged section
13981 as unconstitutional federal legislation."
The Court first restated the three separate categories properly
subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause power outlined in
Lopez and noted that section 13981 fell into the "substantial effects"
category."12 The Court then noted that "the noneconomic, criminal
nature of the conduct at issue was central" to Lopez1' and, after observ-
ing that section 13981 had no jurisdictional element, '14 found that
"[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity. 13 5  The most remarkable difference be-
tween the statute in Lopez and section 13981 was that section 13981 in-
cluded extensive congressional findings that gender-motivated vio-
lence affected interstate commerce by, among other things,
discouraging potential victims from interstate travel and increasing
medical costs.'3 ' Although stopping short of adopting "a categorical
rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity," '
the majority rejected the effects found by Congress because they could
only be reached through a "but-for causal chain from the initial oc-
127 Id. at 602.
128 Id. at 603.
129 Id.
1:40 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (c) (2000).
131 529 U.S. at 604.
132 Id. at 608-09.
I :1 d. at 610.
134 Id. at 613. A jurisdictional element would require a tie to interstate activity as
an element of the offense and would "lend support" to the argument that a given stat-
ute is stIfficiently tied to interstate commerce. Id.
135 Id.
136 See id. at 614 ("In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we faced
in Lopez, § 13981 issupported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact that
gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families.").
137 Id. at 613.
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currence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been
the prime object of the States' police power) to every attenuated effect
upon interstate commerce.',3 8  Morrison therefore made clear both
that Lopez did not turn on the lack of congressional findings and that
the Court would not automatically accept such findings.'" The Court
also noted the importance of maintaining a "distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local.""' The Court could "think of
no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppres-
sion of violent crime and vindication of its victims.,,1
4
B. The Tenth Amendment
The notion, expressed in Lopez and Morrison, of protecting tradi-
tional areas of state authority from federal intrusion draws heavily
from some of the Court's Tenth Amendment cases and cannot fully
be appreciated without an understanding of them. In Maryland v.
Wirtz,142 the Court had the opportunity to consider whether state op-
eration of an institution had any impact on regulation of the institu-
tion under the Commerce Clause. In 1961, Congress extended mini-
mum-wage and maximum-hour laws under the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state-run enterprises such as hospitals and schools."" While the
standards had already been upheld as applied to private companies,
44
Maryland argued that the commerce power did not afford a basis to
extend them to schools and hospitals operated by the states. 4' The
Court upheld the statute, stating that it "[would] not carve up the
commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their ef-
fect on commerce from private businesses, simply because those en-
terprises happen to be run by the States for the benefit of their citi-
138 Id. at 615.
139 See id. at 614 ("[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by
itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.").
140 Id. at 617-18.
1,t Id. at 618.
1412 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruded by Nat' League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), ovemtded by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
143 Id. at 186-87.
1,14 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941) (upholding a policy of"cx-
cluding from interstate commerce all goods produced for the commerce which do not
conform to the specified labor standards").
145 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193.
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zens."'146 At the same time, some of the opinion's language seemed to
hedge this broad holding. The Court was careful to note:
The Act establishes only a minimum wage and a maximum limit of hours
unless overtime wages are paid, and does not otherwise affect the way in
which school and hospital duties are performed. Thus appellants' char-
acterization of the question in this case as whether Congress may, under
the guise of the commerce power, tell the States how to perform medical
and educational functions is not factually 
accurate.',1
7
The holding seemed to imply that the Court would be less accepting
of a federal law that regulated state schools or hospitals in a more sub-
stantive way.
Although not mentioned by the majority in Wirtz, the Tenth
Amendment served as the basis forJustice Douglas's dissent, in which
he argued that the regulations violated federalism principles pro-
tected by the Tenth Amendment.148 The Tenth Amendment was also
the foundation for the Court's opinion in National League of Cities v.
Usery,'41' which overturned Wirtz'5" on incredibly similar facts. As in
Wirtz, the Usery Court found that the subject matter Congress sought
to regulate fell undeniably within its Commerce Clause power.151
However, it held that the Tenth Amendment itself prevented these
otherwise valid regulations from extending to the state-run entities.
This was an interesting theory with broad implications, but before
elaborating much further on it, the Court abandoned it entirely in the
1985 case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.'5i In
Garcia, the Court held that the Tenth Amendment did not shield
states from otherwise valid acts of Congress pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause. '1 4 Under this view, the Tenth Amendment seems in
146 Id. at 198-99.
147 Id. at 193.
148 See id. at 201 (DouglasJ., dissenting) ("[W]hat is done here is nonetheless such
a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in
my view not consistent with our constitutional federalism.").
149 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
150 Id. at 855.
151 Id. at 841.
152 See id. at 852 ("[T]he dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to exer-
cise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum wages and maximum hours
to be paid by the States in their capacities as sovereign governments.").
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
154 See id. at 550 ("With rare exceptions, like the guarantee, in Article IV, § 3, of
state territorial integrity, the Constitution does not carve out express elements of state
sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace.").
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many ways to be nothing more than a truism, reiterating that if a
power is not expressly granted to the federal government in another
part of the Constitution then it is left to the states.' 55 This theory has
prevailed after Garcia, and, as a result, the issue of how to interpret
federal powers enumerated in the Constitution has become increas-
ingly important in the debate about federalism that was formerly car-
ried on in Tenth Amendment decisions. The scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause power, which was central to Wirtz, Usety, and Garcia,
is thus all the more significant to considerations of states' rights.
C. Important Themes in the New Commerce Clause Doctrine
According to one commentator, "[p]erhaps the most striking fea-
ture of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence has been the revival over
the last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional federalism." '5 ' While
striking, the Court's revival of the Commerce Clause doctrine has also
come without expressly overturning old law or announcing new law.5
This has led to a great deal of confusion about the reach of the new
Commerce Clause. Even the Court's own discussion of its three-part
Commerce Clause structure seems to lack clarity. For example, in Lo-
pez, the Court cites Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States"s as a case
155 An exception to this may be the anticommandeering doctrine, which focuses
on whether "Congress may use the States as implements of [federal] regulation." New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935 (1997) (overturning a temporary provision of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 921-931 (2000), for requiring participation by state offi-
cials in the implementation of a federal regulation). However, this doctrine is limited
to preventing Congress from requiring affirmative action on the part of the states. See id.
at 935 ("Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program."). It does not appear to stop federal regulation or prohibition of state pro-
grams and is therefore beyond the scope of this Comment. See Reno v. Condon, 528
U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (sustaining congressional power to bar state motor-vehicle de-
partments from disclosing personal information required for a driver's license or car
registration).
15 Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the RJehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 24,25 (2001).
'57 Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 637 (2000) (SouterJ., dissenting)
("Although a new jurisprudence has not emerged with any distinctness, it is clear that
some congressional conclusions about obviously substantial, cumulative effects on
commerce are being assigned lesser values than the once-stable doctrine would assign
them."); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REv. 605, 616-17
(2001) ("With one hand the majority refuses to relinquish the rational basis test, while
with the other hand the majority strikes down legislation with standards that clearly are
stricter than rational basis.").
108 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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in the "channels" category. 151' Then, in discussing the "substantial ef-
fects" category, the Court also cites Heart of Atlanta Motel as an exam-
ple of a case "where we have concluded that the activity substantially
affected interstate commerce."'""' The 'jurisdictional hook" that the
Court implied might save statutes like the one in Lopez has also come
under scrutiny as a confusing concept with the potential to become a
tremendous loophole in the new Commerce Clause doctrine.""6
Regardless of its possible shortcomings, however, it is clear that
the Court is developing a new approach to Commerce Clause analysis,
and, while there are no bright-line rules, the new approach has impor-
tant and identifiable components. In particular, there is a sharp dis-
tinction between the way the Court will analyze economic activity and
the way it will analyze noneconomic activity under the substantial ef-
fects test. ''2 If an activity is economic, regulation of that activity will be
upheld, while if it is noneconomic, it will very likely be overturned."'
The Court has refrained from adopting any standard or test to de-
termine whether an activity is economic or noneconomic and has
noted how uncertain such an inquiry might be.'3' Nonetheless, it is
clear that the idea of traditional state authority bears at least some re-
lation to this determination. In his dissenting opinion in Morrison,
Justice Souter implied that this was a key component for the Court:
The legitimacy of the Court's current emphasis on the noncommercial
nature of regulated activity, then, does not turn on any logic serving the
text of the Commerce Clause .... The essential issue is rather the
strength of the majority's claim to have a constitutional warrant for its
159 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
"W Id. at 559.
161 See generally Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism Af-
ter Lopez and Morrison: The Case fur Closing theJurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L.
REv. 1675, 1680 (2002) (providing a detailed discussion of the jurisdictional hook and
arguing that the "state-line crossing requirement does not impose meaningful limits on
congressional regulation").
62 "While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of
any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's his-
tory our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
"63 See supra Part ll.A.1 (discussing Lopez and its distinction between economic and
noneconomic activities).
14 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 ("Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate
activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncer-
tainty.").
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current conception of a federal relationship enforceable by this Court
through limits on otherwise plenary commerce power.
Although the majority never identified precisely the importance of
federalism in determining whether an activity is economic or not, it
mentioned the issue repeatedly in its analysis.
Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed traditional state functions as
part of his reasoning in both the Lopez and Morrison opinions. In Lo-
pez, in particular, he focused on the idea that education is a traditional
interest of the states as opposed to a commercial activity of some
sort.'66 This is noteworthy because a school is very much like a com-
mercial enterprise except that it is run by the State. j' 7 Rehnquist's
reasoning seems to imply that State operation of a given endeavor
weighs against a finding that the endeavor is commercial in Com-
merce Clause analysis.
Most remarkable is Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez,
in which he explicitly argued that if an activity is traditionally left to
the states, then federal commerce power should be limited under the
substantial effects test.'"8 In Commerce Clause analysis, says Justice
Kennedy, "we must inquire whether the exercise of national power
165 529 U.S. at 645 (SouterJ., dissenting).
Nki In dismissing Justice Breyer's dissent, in which justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburgjoined, ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted:
Justice Breyer's rationale lacks any real limits because, depending on the level
of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial. Under the dis-
sent's rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child rearing as [com-
mercial] .... We do not doubt that Congress has authority under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce and also affect the educational process. That
authority, though broad, does not include the authority to regulate each and
every aspect of local schools.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66; see also Morison, 529 U.S. at 615-16 ("Petitioners' reasoning,
moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as we suggested in
Lopez, be applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regu-
lation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national
economy is undoubtedly significant.").
167 Indeed, in the Tenth Amendment context, the Court found that even a state-
run school was a commercial enterprise. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193
(1968) (holding that a publicly operated school is a commercial enterprise for pur-
poses of regulating minimum wages and maximum hours).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were the Federal Gov-
ernment to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas
having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries be-
tween the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility
would become illusory.").
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seeks to intrude upon an area of traditional state concern. ' This
approach draws on themes from the Court's Tenth Amendment cases
but has significantly different implications. Instead of providing blan-
ket immunity to states from Congress's otherwise valid exercise of
Commerce Clause power, here the question of whether an activity is
of traditional state concern directly impacts the Commerce Clause
power inquiry itself. Although the extent of the relationship is not
clear, it is certain that if an activity is traditionally regulated exclusively
by the State, this will weigh in favor of a finding that Congress has ex-
ceeded its Commerce Clause authority.
III. PRIVATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA DISTRIBUTION
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A medical marijuana challenge to the CSA would fall into the sub-
stantial effects category of Lopez.""° Medical marijuana advocates
would first have to argue that the regulated activity is noneconomic.
If successful, they would then need to refute Congress's contention
that the intrastate regulation in question is necessary to the regulatory
scheme. Such an inquiry would consider whether it is actually feasible
for the government to distinguish between marijuana cultivated and
used intrastate from that moved in interstate commerce, as well as
what Congress's valid regulatory goal is and how that goal would be
impacted if the class of intrastate activity in question could not be
reached by Congress.
A. The Controlled Substances Act
The federal government currently criminalizes marijuana as part
of the CSA's broad classification scheme. Controlled substances are
I9 Id. at 580 (Kennedy,]J., concurring). Justice Kennedy argued that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 "foreclose[d] the States from experimenting and exercising
their own judgment in an area to which States la[id] claim by right of history and ex-
pertise, and it d[id] so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the
ordinary and usual sense of that term." Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy further observed, "Absent a stronger connection or identification with com-
mercial concerns that are central to the Commerce Clause, [the regulation] contra-
dicts the federal balance the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to en-
force." Id. (Kennedy,J., concurring).
170 This is because medical marijuana advocates would use intrastate activity as a
basis for such a challenge.
171 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of the
CSA).
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divided into five "Schedules,"'' 72 each with increasingly strict regula-
tions. Marijuana is a Schedule I drug. Schedule I drugs are consid-
ered to have a high potential for abuse and no currently accepted
medical use7 and are therefore regulated in a prohibition model.
Cocaine, in comparison, is a Schedule II drug, 75 which means that it
has a currently accepted medical use. '7 A drug can be reclassified
from one schedule to another only through the political process or by
administrative action.1
77
Obviously, the CSA reaches a great deal of purely intrastate activ-
ity, particularly with respect to prohibition of simple possession. It is
not uncommon for substances like marijuana or hallucinogenic
mushrooms to be grown for personal use instead of interstate sale.
Recognizing this fact, Congress enacted findings to help sustain the
CSA against a potential Commerce Clause challenge. Congress ob-
served, for example: "A major portion of the traffic in controlled sub-
stances flows through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of
the traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign
flow... nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon inter-
state commerce ..... ,78 Moreover, Congress found that "[c]ontrolled
substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differ-
entiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed in-
terstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, be-
tween controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate
and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate.'
7
Finally, Congress asserted that "[flederal control of the intrastate in-
cidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effec-
tive control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.' 8 0  Congress
used these findings to ground its power to regulate purely intrastate
drug activities.
172 21 U.S.C. § 812(a) (2'000).
17. § 812(c) sched. 1.
174 § 812(b) (1) (A)-(B).
175 § 812(c) sched. II.
176 § 812(b)(2) (B).
177 See § 811 (setting forth the administrative process for overseeing the CSA).
17S § 80 (3).
171, § 801 (5).
18) § 801 (6).
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B. Challenges Under Existing State Law
A private medical marijuana dispensary operating legally under
state law may try to challenge federal action against it by claiming
Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in passing the
CSA.' 8' An individual who cultivates medical marijuana for her per-
sonal use may make a similar challenge. For example, in Raich v. Ash-
croft, filed in the Northern District of California in October 2002, the
plaintiffs are two medical marijuana patients, Angel McClary Raich
and Diane Monson, and two caregivers,John Doe Number 1 andJohn
Doe Number 2. 8 They are seeking an injunction to prevent en-
forcement of the CSA as a regulation of their medical-marijuana-
related conduct. John Doe Number 1 and John Doe Number 2 cul-
tivate marijuana, which they provide to Raich, who is unable to culti-
vate it for herself, and which they grow using products manufacturedI 184
in California exclusively. Monson grows marijuana for her own per-
sonal medical use.""" Though the personal-cultivation scenario is
more likely to fall on the noneconomic line of a Lopez analysis, it is of
little consequence practically.
Any medical marijuana challenge by private parties will almost
certainly fail under the theory that their intrastate activity must be
regulated as necessary for the enforcement of the CSA.1 Already, the
district court in United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club has held that a
medical marijuana dispensary's activities were validly regulated under
the commerce power.117 There, the Cannabis Cultivators Club (CCC)
argued that its activity of providing marijuana to gravely ill persons for
their medical use was outside the reach of the commerce power and
could be distinguished from prior circuit cases upholding the CSA 81
because (1) its activity was legal under state law and thus was not
within the class of activities regulated by the CSA, and (2) its activity
SSee Gaura, supra note 26 (reporting the Santa Cruz medical marijuana hospice's
decision to sue the federal government for the return of confiscated marijuana under
a Commerce Clause theory).
182 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 27, at 5.
183 Id. at 1-2.
184 Id. at 5-6.
185 Id.
[86 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
187 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1097-98 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
188 See, e.g., United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding, in
a case decided after Lopez but before Momison, that Congress's findings in the CSA were
enough to ground its commerce power to enact the CSA).
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did not substantially affect interstate commerce. The court assumed
that the activity was "within a different 'class of activities' from that
which Congress expressly considered" and that the CCC's conduct in
the particular instances before the court had no interstate effect.)()
Nevertheless, the court rejected the CCC's argument because the ac-
tivity was within a class-"non-profit distribution of medical mari-
juana"-that may have had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. 19 The court noted that the class of not-for-profit medical
marijuana distribution was not one that was by its nature limited to in-
trastate activity, implying that regulation of the class was necessary to
achieve the purposes of the CSA.'92 The court observed:
To hold that the Controlled Substances Act is unconstittItional as ap-
plied here would mean that in every action in which a plaintiff seeks to
prove a defendant violated federal law, an element of every case-in-chief
would be that the defendant's specific conduct at issue, based on facts
proved at an evidentiary hearing or trial, substantially affected interstate
1*
commerce.
Thus, the court held that it was immaterial that the CCC's specific ac-
tivities were intrastate since the class could be reached under the
commerce power.
The court's reasoning in Cannabis Cultivators Club has been ech-
oed by other courts in commerce-power challenges to federal drug
laws that do not involve medical marijuana. The Fourth Circuit found
that, since Lopez expressly reaffirmed the power to reach trivial activity
under a general regulatory statute, it did not matter that the CSA
"does not require the government to show that the specific conduct at
issue substantially affected interstate commerce.' ,1 4 This logic should
also be controlling in Raich, where the plaintiffs are arguing that Con-
gress lacks the authority to prohibit-or to allow the DEA to pro-
hibit-their activity because it is purely noncommercial, intrastate ac-
I89 Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
190 Id. at 1097-98.
191 Id. at 1098.
192 See id. ("Medical marijuana may be grown locally, or out of the state or country,
and there is nothing in the nature of medical marijuana that limits it to intrastate cul-
tivation.").
193 Id.
194 United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Proyect v.
United States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The fact that certain intrastate activities
within this class, such as growing marijuana solely for personal consumption, may not
actually have a significant effect on interstate commerce is ... irrelevant.").
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tivity that has no effect on interstate commerce. ""' "The activities for
which Plaintiffs seek protection in this case are purely intrastate ac-
tions pursuant to valid California State law-the personal cultivation
and personal use of cannabis for medical purposes by California citi-
zens as recommended by the patients' physicians."'"" Despite this ar-
gument, Congress can regulate the activity if it is essential to a broader
regulation.
To determine if Congress needs to reach a certain class of activity
to effectuate its broad regulation, one must consider the goal of the
regulation. The relevant congressional goal is the prohibition of the
interstate marijuana trade, whether medical or not. Since the general
class of intrastate marijuana production is undoubtedly a part of the
interstate drug trade, the class is an essential part of the valid regula-
tory goal. If Congress were not allowed to reach wholly intrastate pri-
vate production of marijuana within this class, the CSA would be se-
verely undercut. A court may then ask whether the plaintiffs activity
is of a class that may be distinguished from the larger class of mari-
juana. However, the distinction does not seem feasible because the
only way to determine whether a private actor is cultivating marijuana
for intrastate medical use or interstate distribution is by making a case-
by-case determination at trial. There is no easy statutory way to distin-
guish the categories.
Even if distinguishing private, nonprofit medical marijuana distri-
bution operating legally under state law were feasible, it would likely
undermine the regulatory scheme. For example, one might cultivate
a large amount of marijuana, using some for intrastate medical pur-
poses and some for interstate distribution. "In Northern California,
Humboldt County officials said marijuana growers are allowed to grow
hundreds of plants while claiming to be a medical caregiver to multi-
ple patients, and no documentation is required." 1!1 If Congress could
not reach medical cultivation permitted by state law, it would seriously
undermine its ability to regulate that same person's cultivation for in-
terstate distribution. Furthermore, the private, nonprofit distribution
of medical marijuana is itself an interstate market, as there is no safe-
195 Plaintiffs' Memorandum, sulpra note 27, at 6-7.
Id. at 6.
197 Danny Freedman, Study: Most Medical Pot Users Older Men,, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ONLINE, Nov. 30, 2002, 2002 WL 103441487. For a general discussion of experiences
with state medical marijuana programs, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MARIJUANA: EARLY EXPERIENCES WITi FOUR STATES' L-AWS THAT ALLOW USE FOR
MEDICAL PURPOSES (2002), available at http://Nvw.gao.gov/new.items/103189.pdf.
20031 1815
1816 UNIVERSITY OFIENNSYLVANIA [AWREVIEW [Vol. 151:1787
guard preventing a private actor from engaging in interstate medical
distribution. Therefore, even the plaintiffs in Raich, who themselves
are almost certainly engaged in purely intrastate noneconomic activ-
ity-going so far as to use only products manufactured in California
for their cultivation-are unlikely to prevail on a Commerce Clause
theory. A state-run program, however, may be more successful be-
cause of both the federalism concerns that underlie Lopez and Morni-
son and the reasons that allow Congress to reach purely intrastate
commerce.
IV. SHOULD THE STATES GROW THEIR OWN?
This Part analyzes a potential Commerce Clause argument on be-
half of a state-run medical marijuana distribution program.' 9 The
program would provide marijuana free of charge on a weekly or
monthly basis to a patient suffering from a medical condition that
meets the state's limited and well-defined list. The patient would be
required to obtain and regularly renew a written doctor's recommen-
dation clearly listing the accepted medical ailment. With the recom-
mendation, and upon proof of state residence, the patient would re-
ceive a photo identification card. When filling the prescription at a
distribution center, the patient would be required to show state identi-
fication that shared the same address as her identification card. To
help ensure that the patient continued to reside within the state, the
state would send stickers to this same address on a bimonthly basis
that the patient would be required to place on her card. In order to
cover the costs of this program, each patient would have to pay a bi-
monthly fee to keep her identification card valid and receive the
stickers.
The marijuana would be grown by the state itself and distributed• 199
in cigarette form at state hospitals or police stations. Although it
would be more efficient for the state to adopt a program to test and
distribute marijuana seized through the enforcement of state drug
198 The framework of this theoretical program is based in part on ideas presented
in initiatives in Arizona and San Francisco. For a discussion of Arizona's initiative, see
ARIZ. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DRUG MEDICALIZATION, PREVENTION AND CONTROL Acr
OF 2002: ANALYSIS BY LEGISIATIVE COUNCIL (2002), available at http://
vww.azleg.state.az.tis/legtext/451eg/l I 12002DMPCA.pdf; for San Francisco's initiative,
see Measure S: Medical Marijuana County of San Francisco, League of Women Voters of
Cal. (Dec. 6, 2002), at http://v.smartvoter.org/2002/I 1/05/ca/sf/imeas/S.
19 Each cigarette would contain a distinct label to unmistakably indicate it. was
part of the state program.
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laws, the jurisdictional-hook doctrine makes this system problematic.
It is likely that Congress could prevent the implementation of this
program, even in the face of a successful Commerce Clause challenge,
simply by prohibiting distribution of marijuana that has at one time
moved in interstate commerce. This would almost certainly cover a
great deal of the seized marijuana and, even if there were substantial
amounts of purely intrastate-seized marijuana, it would be prohibi-
tively expensive for a state to determine which particular marijuana
had ever traveled interstate and which had not. There are of course
arguments that a jurisdictional hook would not reach a system using
seized marijuana;0 0 however, the distinct possibility makes state culti-
vation the safest route for medical marijuana proponents. T1 For ease
of discussion, this program, relying on state cultivation, will be re-
ferred to as the "State Program."
200 For example, one could argue that state seizure of marijuana removes the mari-
juana from commerce entirely, thus rendering the marijuana property of the state and
negating any previous interstate movement. Similarly, the jurisdictional hook may not
be enough in itself to ensure that there is a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
For example, in United Slates v. Rodia, the Third Circuit held that a jurisdictional hook
was not sufficient to place the statute in the substantial effects category. 194 F.3d 465,
473 (3d Cir. 1999). The court in Rodia considered a statute criminalizing the posses-
sion of child pornography that itself had not traveled in interstate commerce, but
where the materials from which the pornography was created-Polaroid film-had so
traveled. Id. at 468. The court found that precursors like the film or the developing
chemicals were too tenuously related to the regulated activity to ground commerce
power. Id. at 473. The court observed:
A hard and fast rule that the presence of a jurisdictional element automati-
cally ensures the constitutionality of a statute ignores the fact that the connec-
tion between the activity regulated and the Jurisdictional hook may be so at-
tenuated as to fail to guarantee that the activity regulated has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.
Id. at 472. Thus, the court adopted a rule that a "jurisdictional element is only sutffi-
cient to ensure a statute's constitutionality when the element either limits the regula-
tion to interstate activity or ensures that the intrastate activity to be regulated falls
within one of the three categories of congressional power." Id. at 473. Under this
rule, a system of distributing seized marijuana may well be safe from a "jurisdictional-
hook" law.
201 This is not to say that a system distributing seized mariTirjuana is not worth ptU'SL-
ing. In addition to being significantly less costly and more efficient than state-grown
marijuana, it is probably more politically palatable than state-grown marijttana. It also
might provide for a somewhat stronger argument that the activity is not economic.
Seizing marijuana is a state police power, whereas marijuana cultivation may be con-
sidered more nearly economic.
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A. Economic Versus Noneconomic
As previous court cases have demonstrated, congressional power
to implement its drug policies falls tinder the "substantial effects"
'2
category of Lopez and Morrison. The most important question in a
"substantial effects" analysis is whether the class of activity under the
State Program is economic in nature or whether it is a noneconomic
activity traditionally left to the states .2' The Court has not announced
a standard or test for making this determination. Indeed, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist has said, "Admittedly, a determination whether an in-
trastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases
result in legal uncertainty. 2 1  While it is therefore impossible to for-
mulate a precise answer to the question, comparing the State Program
with the discussion in Lopez and Mornison indicates that there is a
strong claim that the activity is not economic.
The State Program's marijuana distribution is certainly not eco-
nomic activity in the strictest sense of the word, as the primary pur-
pose of the program is not to make money but to provide for the
health of the state's citizens. Nevertheless, this alone might not be
enough to place the State Program on the noneconomic side of the
line. The Lopez Court noted that Wickard, which upheld regulation of
wheat cultivation for intrastate use,20 "involved economic activity in a
way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not."2 I At first
glance, this may be taken to mean that cultivation is a commercial ac-
tivity,2 17 but a closer reading of the majority's reasoning reveals that
the Court did not make this finding.
The Court's statement in Lopez that the activity in Wickard had an
economic link seems to stand merely for the proposition that non-
economic intrastate activity may be regulated if it is essential to a
broader economic interstate regulation. This interpretation is the
most logical for two reasons. First, the majority's explanation of
2012 See, e.g., United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086,1097-98
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (analyzing a medical marijuana challenge under the "substantial ef-
fects" doctrine), rev'd sub ore. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190
F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), re'd, 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
20 ,See sapra Part I .A (discussing the Counrt's approach to substantial effects).
204 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
205 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
206 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
207 In dissenting from the Lopez majority, Justice Breyer noted that the Court in
Wickard expressly found that homegrown wheat consumption was not a commercial
activity. Id. at 628 (Breyerj., dissenting).
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Wickard's economic link focused exclusively on the fact that the wheat
production obstructed the purposes of a larger economic regula-
tion .2 The Court noted that the Act at issue in Wickard "was designed
to regulate the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign
commerce" and then recounted the Wickard Court's finding that the
regulation of intrastate production of wheat was necessary to effectu-
ate that congressional purpose. 2119 The Court concluded its discussion
by finding that "[s]ection 9 22(q) is not an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated," and cannot
therefore be upheld under the aggregation doctrine of Wickard 
Second, the Wickard Court clearly stated that the wheat production in
question was not commercial. 2 ' The Lopez Court surely was not igno-
rant of this fact,2 12 and it is equally unlikely that it would substitute its
own view for the Wickard Court's factual finding, particularly given
some of the Justices' professed aversions to judicial activism.2 " There-
fore, the State Program would not be considered economic under
Wickard simply because it involves cultivation or distribution.
At the same time, the Court's reasoning with regard to Wickard
does not necessarily mean the State Program would be considered
208 See id. at 560-61 (observing that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (2000), was designed to avoid surpluses and shortages of wheat in
order to stabilize prices and noting that home-grown and home-consumed wheat
would hamper such a purpose).
Id. at 560; see also Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128 (noting that "[h]ome-grown
wheat.. . competes with wheat in commerce").
210) Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
2 See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (holding that Congress could regulate home-grown
wheat production, even "though it may not be regarded as commerce").
2 As indicated supra note 207, justice Breyer in dissent specifically noted this
finding.
21) See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863
(1989) ("[T]he main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution-or, for that
matter, in judicial interpretation of any law-is that the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law."); see also Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an "Activist"
Court? The Commerce Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1281 (2002) ("[W] hile the
Rehnquist court may indeed be an activist court in its method, the results it has
reached are less activist than those of previous courts in precisely those cases where its
activism is now being criticized-most especially in its Commerce Clause decisions.").
But see Christopher E. Smith & Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Courtn Activism and
the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REV. 53, 57 (1993) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court
is an activist court despite the Justices' claims of believing in 'judicial conservatism").
While the question of whether the Rehnquist Court is an activist court is the subject of
much debate, for purposes of this Comment it is sufficient to note that this is not how
the conservativeJustices of the Court view themselves.
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noneconomic, especially since cultivation and distribution are ordi-
narily done in conjunction with economic enterprises. A key question
in this close case would be whether this cultivation and distribution is
part of an activity traditionally left to the states.' 4 Here, the cultiva-
tion and distribution are part of a state health program that does not
aim to make money for the state. Furthermore, the federal govern-
ment itself does not regulate marijuana activities as if they were eco-
nomic; rather, they are regulated as criminal and health related. Ac-
cording to the CSA, the scheduling of marijuana is based entirely on
health considerations, and, as a Schedule I substance, essentially all
marijuana activity is criminal.
Both health and criminal activities are traditionally within state
domain. In Lopez, the Court reiterated: ""'States possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. "  It went on
to criticize the GFSZA because its "'prohibitions apply even in States
that have chosen not to outlaw the conduct in question.'' 1 7 This is
particularly relevant here, as the federal government's regulation
would outlaw a program that the state determined to be necessary for
the health of its citizens .2I The state's traditional power over health is
214 See supra Part II.C (discussing the importance of federalism principles in recent
Commerce Clause cases).
215 There are limited exceptions, such as marijuana use by the remaining Compas-
sionate IND patients, see supra text accompanying notes 56-59 (describing the Compas-
sionate IND program), or in highly regulated scientific studies, see 21 U.S.C. § 823
(2000) (allowing the use of Schedule I substances in a strictly controlled research proj-
ect registered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in conjunction with the
Attorney General).
21fi Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 1.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635
(1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982))).
217 Id. (quoting the government's brief).
8Judge Koziski's concurrence in Conant v. Waiters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002),
although in the context of a private scheme, nicely explains the implications for feder-
alism principles in this type of situation. In Conant, the federal government sought to
effectively prevent California from implementing its medical marijuana law by stop-
ping doctors from recommending marijuana to their patients. Id. at 632-33; see s .uIra
text accompanying notes 79-81 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision). Judge Kozin-
ski argued that while "[t1ederal efforts to regulate [medical marijuana] considerably
blur the distinction between what is national and what is local," "allowing the federal
government, already nearing the outer limits of its power, to act through unwilling
state officials would 'obliterate the distinction' entirely." Conant, 309 F.3d at 647 (Koz-
inski, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557). These same federalism con-
cerns are even stronger in considering the problem of the State Program. Judge Koz-
inski found the federal government's indirect interference with California law "[ran]
afoul" of federalism principles that limit how Congress "may use the power it has." Id.
at 645, 647 (Kozinski,J., concurring). With the State Program, the federal government
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likewise widely recognized. States may enact civil commitment
schemes2  or mandatory vaccination programs to provide for the
health of their citizens. Justice Kennedy has argued that there is "sub-
stantial authority allowing the State to take sides in a medical debate,
even when fundamental liberty interests are at stake and even when
leading members of the profession disagree with the conclusions
drawn by the legislature. 2 2 ' Furthermore, the Court has noted that a
state could completely prohibit the use of Schedule II drugs, which
are allowed for medical use under federal law, because of its broad
power over health regulations. Particularly relevant here is the
Court's theory that when "'Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught
with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be
especially broad.'
2 2
Though it is impossible to be certain given the lack of standards
provided by the Court, many of the factors that lead the Court to
strike down the statutes in Lopez and Morrison point to a similar con-
clusion. The State Program is a not-for-profit health-care activity, and
there can be little dispute that, to the extent traditional areas of state
authority can be defined, health and criminal law are among them.
As Justice Kennedy noted, the Court has a "particular duty to ensure
that the federal-state balance is not destroyed" when Congress seeks to
encroach upon state prerogative in traditional areas of state con-
cern.2  In view of these considerations, and particularly the lack of
guidance from the Court on how to decide the economic question, to
would seek not merely to make implementation of the State Program more difficult,
but to forbid it entirely.
21) See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997) ("We have consistently up-
held such involuntary commitment statutes...."). Civil commitment entails the
"forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior." Id.
220) SeeJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (holding that it was a valid
exercise of the state's police power to enact a statute requiring vaccination).
221 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 970 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
222 See 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (2000) (permitting prescriptions of Schedule I1 sub-
stances).
223 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977) ("It is, of course, well settled
that the State has broad police powers in regulating the administration of drugs by the
health professions.").
224 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (quoting Mar-shall v. United
States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974)).
225 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (KennedyJ., concurring); see
also id. at 583 (KennedyJ., concurring) ("The [GFSZA] forecloses the States from ex-
perimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by
right of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm
of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term.").
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move to the next step in the Commerce Clause inquiry it is sufficient
to say that the most relevant factors seem to weigh heavily toward a
noneconomic finding, while few factors would indicate that the State
Program is an economic endeavor.
B. Essential to Larger Economic Regulation?
Once placed in the noneconomic category, the most important
question is whether the activity can still be sustained as an essential
part of a larger valid economic regulation. This is particularly the case
after the Court's decision in Morrison, in which the Court demon-
strated that even in the face of congressional findings clearly showing
the substantial impact of the intrastate noneconomic conduct on in-
terstate commerce, the Court will almost certainly refrain from aggre-
gating the purely intrastate conduct in question.2 2 ' Therefore, the "es-
sential to the regulation" theory is the only currently accepted basis
for regulating noneconomic intrastate activity under the Commerce
Clause.227
The standard for determining whether a noneconomic intrastate
activity is essential to a larger economic regulation is even more un-
certain than that for answering the economic activity question. The
Court has not had occasion to apply this theory in its recent holdings
or in pre-Lopez holdings, where all commerce regulations were rou-
tinely upheld under rational basis scrutiny.22  Nevertheless, the rele-
vant factors in this inquiry are largely self-evident. Unlike the broad
question of whether an activity is economic, the question of whether a
given intrastate activity is essential to a valid economic regulation is
necessarily confined to a very specific relationship.
In considering whether a given intrastate activity falls under this
exception, one must first determine the intrastate activity (as a class)
and the valid congressional regulatory goal. The regulatory goal must
be legitimate, or Congress could reach any activity simply by stating
that a goal required regulation of that activity. For example, Lopez's
activity was undoubtedly essential to a broad regulation of gun posses-
226 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("While we need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activ-
ity[] ... our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature.").
227 It should be reemphasized that the Court has stopped short of announcing a
bright-line rule against aggregation of noneconomic activity. Id.
228 See suna Part II.A (discussing pre-Lopez Commerce Clause doctrine).
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sions near a school, but such a goal is not an interstate goal and,
therefore, is not legitimate.
In this instance, the class of activity is best defined as "state distri-
bution of medical marijuana." Marijuana regulation prohibits the in-
terstate marijuana trade in order "to deal in a comprehensive fashion
with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States. '' ' To
determine if regulation of the State Program is essential to this regula-
tory scheme, one should first ask whether it is feasible to distinguish
between the purely intrastate class in question and other, broader
classes of activity covered by the regulation. If the government is not
able to make this distinction easily, and there is valid power to regu-
late the broader class, regulation of the intrastate activity is essential to
achieve the goal since requiring a burdensome case-by-case finding
would undermine the regulation. Even if it is feasible for the gov-
ernment to distinguish the intrastate activity, it may fall under the "es-
sential to a broader regulation" exception. It would be impossible to
achieve the goal of increasing the national price of a commodity, for
example, without regulating all production of that commodity.
First, it is feasible to distinguish the class of activity governed by
the State Program from the broader regulated class. Although Con-
gress found that intrastate substances "cannot be differentiated from
controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate,2 ° that
conclusory statement is not true for the State Program. The Program
involves a clearly defined and limited group of actors engaged in the
specific activity of cultivating and dispensing medical marijuana. In
addition, the Program's provisions, like the one requiring that dis-
pensed cigarettes should be clearly marked to indicate that they are
part of the State Program, help ensure that the intrastate class of activ-
ity is easy to distinguish. The contrast with private medical marijuana
cultivators is particularly stark here. In United States v. Cannabis Culti-
vators Club, the court found that "[m]edical marijuana may be grown
locally, or out of the state or country, and there is nothing in the na-
ture of medical marijuana that limits it to intrastate cultivation. '23 ,
Here, the State Program is by its nature limited to in-state activity and
distinguishable from private marijuana-related activity.
22) H.R. REP. No. 94-1444, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567.
230 21 U.S.C. § 801(5) (2000).
231 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd sub nora. United States v. Oak-
land Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), revd, 532
U.S. 483 (2001).
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With this hurdle passed, the actual relationship between the State
Program and Congress's regulatory goal must be examined. Congress
has found that intrastate marijuana activity is essential to interstate en-
forcement because, "after manufacture, many controlled substances
are transported in interstate commerce, [and] controlled substances
distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate com-
merce immediately before their distribution. ' 'B:
Congress's contention that it is essential to regulate the class of ac-
tivity does not necessarily make the regulation essential.2" The perti-
nent question is what impact the State Program, if left outside con-
gressional reach, would have on Congress's larger regulation. In
Wickard, the Court was able to reach wheat production because, if the
class of wheat production was left unregulated, it would severely un-
dermine the regulatory goal2 : 4 .. "the goods at issue.., were being
substituted for the interstate wheat that the statute attempted to regu-
late.' 5  In contrast, statutes that criminalize gun or drug possession
involve a different sort of economic analysis.3 ' Here, the CSA does
not seek to control the price of marijuana but rather to prevent its in-
terstate distribution entirely.
Some of the CSA's findings to ground commerce power over in-
trastate activity are immediately inapplicable. For example, the State
Program's marijuana will have been grown intrastate and not obtained
232 § 801(3) (A)-(B).
"43 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("[T]he existence of
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of
Commerce Clause legislation .... 'Simply because Congress may conclude that a par-
ticular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so.""' (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) (quoting Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring)))).
SeeWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) ("One of the primary purposes
of' the Act... was to ... limit the volume [of wheat] that could affect the market. It
can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed
wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions.").
23 United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 476 (3d Cir. 1999).
24 As the Third Circuit explained:
[M]any courts have applied the Wickard principle to criminal statutes, con-
cluding that suppressing the intrastate demand for a good (for example, by
criminalizing possession of guns or drugs) would have a substantial impact on
interstate commerce by affecting the supply of that good. In many cases, this
will be a reasonable assumption. We note, however, that [this] economic
model is different from Wickard's substitution analysis, a fact that many courts
have glossed over.
Id. at 477 (citations omitted).
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2.37
through interstate commerce:. The Program may nevertheless Un-
dermine the CSA by contributing to the swell in marijuana activity '' 8
or because valid in-state medical users may attempt to bring their
marijuana across state lines for sale or personal use.: While the first
point may be disputed, 4 it is inevitable that at least some minimal
number of patients will travel across state lines with marijuana ob-
tained through the State Program. The Court has provided no clear
guidelines for determining whether this fact is enough to "under-
mine" the criminalization of interstate marijuana activity. The fact
that some of the intrastate activity has a direct ie to interstate activity
will not always provide Commerce Clause authority; in Lopez, for ex-
ample, certainly some of the guns that were regulated, and probably
the vast majority of them, had moved in interstate commerce at one
time or another. Still, the Court might find that Congress has a par-
ticularly pressing interest in ensuring that marijuana is not taken
across state lines, and so even minor incidents would be enough to
undermine the broad scope of the CSA.
CONCLUSION
Though the ambiguity of the current "substantial effects" doctrine
makes a clear analysis difficult, a number of factors indicate that a
state-run medical marijuana program would have a strong Commerce
Clause argument against federal regulation. A state-run medical mari-
juana program would implicate federalism principles that leave tradi-
tional authority over health care and criminal law to the states. A
state-run program's activity would also be easily distinguishable from
the general marijuana trade, which is vital to the consideration of
whether the program's activities are "essential" to a larger regulation.
At the same time, the lack of clarity in current Commerce Clause ju-
237 Cf 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (B) (2000) ("[C]ontrolled substances distributed locally
usually have been transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distri-
bution .... ).
2.48 See § 801(4) ("Local distribution and possession of controlled substances con-
tribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.").
239 See § 801 (3) (A), (C) ("[A]fter manufacture, many controlled substances are
transported in interstate commerce,... [and] controlled substances possessed com-
monly flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to such possession.").
The congressional findings on this point likely refer to the fact that, in the pri-
vate market, increased local demand and sale of marijuana will lead to a swell in inter-
state traffic to meet the demand. This concern does not seem to apply here. In fact,
one might argue that the State Program reduces the interstate trade in marijuana by
providing a purely intrastate source for medical users.
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risprudence may itself weigh against medical marijuana advocates
hoping to make this challenge. Given the political considerations in
play, the Court may well use this leeway to allow for medical marijuana
to be analyzed differently than other activities. Commentators and at-
torneys already refer to a "drug exception" to the Fourth Amend-
ment,2 4 1 insinuating that the Justices' political and personal feelings
about drugs might color their legal holdings. Nonetheless, given the
continued hostility toward medical marijuana on the part of federal
elected officials, a Commerce Clause challenge to regulation of a
state-run distribution program is currently the best strategy available
to patients who seek a system of legal medical marijuana distribution.
In addition to the potential for success in the legal world, implement-
ing a state-run system would also put additional political pressure on
the federal government, forcing it to enforce federal law by suing the
states themselves-not private clubs.
241 See Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 909-10 (1987) (noting that "defense lawyers have begun to joke
nervously about the 'drug exception to the [F]ourth [A] rnendrnent"').
